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Abstract 
Since the early 90’s the West German firms have to deal with sharp 
changes of economic environment: the German Unification, the emerging 
competitors in the east European countries and the deregulation of several 
labour market institutions. We analyse the wage structure, the wage 
changes and the labour mobility during this period using the linked em-
ployer-employee dataset from the Institute for Employment Research for 
the years 1993, 1995 and 2000. The dataset allows us to investigate es-
pecially the wage structure within firms and the exit and entry rates of 
workers at firm level. The main finding is that both wage inequality within 
and between firms and workers mobility was rising during the 90’s. This 
development is mainly driven by the dynamics of high wage workers and 
high wage firms. The rising variance of wages can only partly be explained 
by a change in the occupational composition of firms. A decomposition of 
the variance of wages shows that the importance of the firm-specific 
variation increases, whereas that of human capital variation decreases. 
 
 
 
 
 
This study is prepared as a chapter for the NBER volume The Structure of Wages 
Within Firms – Europe and the United States, edited by Edward Lazear and 
Katryn Shaw. The volume will do cross-country comparisons on some basic is-
sues that relate to wage structures and hierarchical patterns and is a project 
form the Personnel Economics NBER Working Group. A former version of the ma-
terial in this chapter was presented at the Empirical Personnel Economics NBER 
Meeting in Boston, April 17, 2004. We have benefited a lot from comments and 
valuable suggestions from Gesine Stephan, from the conference participants and 
especially from Edward Lazear and Kathryn Shaw. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the early 90’s the West German firms have to deal with sharp 
changes of economic environment: the German Unification and the 
emerging competitors in the east European countries. In the same time 
some parts of the labour market in Germany was deregulated. The 
changes have impacts on the labour market development in West Ger-
many. Our study gives an overview about the West German structure and 
dynamics of wages and the mobility for different kinds of jobs in plants 
with a private ownership during the 90’s. The German data have yet no 
information about the company (firm) as a commercial aggregate mean-
ing that all analyses done for Germany refer to single plants. However, 
hereafter we make no difference between the terms firm, establishments, 
plants and employer.  
We present descriptive statistics about wages, wage changes and labour 
mobility and provide for deeper analysis a variance decomposition and a 
propensity score matching analysis. The latter investigates the treatment 
effects of collective agreement on the structure and dynamics of wages as 
well as on turnover on establishment level in Germany for the years 1993, 
1995 and 2000. The statistics are computed with a version of the linked-
employer-employee-data of the IAB, LIAB. The LIAB consist of the IAB-
establishment panel (a survey) and administrative individual data from 
the employment statistics of the German social security system.  
The structure of the data is described in section 2. In section 3 we refer to 
the macroeconomic situation in the nineties and relevant labour market 
institutions. Then in section 4 we discuss the empirical results. Section 5 
summarizes and concludes the paper.  
2 Data 
The employment statistics register of the Federal Employment Service is 
based on the integrated notification procedure for the health, pension and 
unemployment insurances, which was introduced first in 1975. This proce-
dure requires employers to report the social security agencies about all 
employees covered by social security. Notifications have to be submitted 
to the social security agencies within certain periods at the beginning and 
the end of any employment relationship as well as each year on December 
31st for all employment relationships subject to social security contribu-
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tions. The notifications include information about employees’ entries, exits 
and wages, gender, qualification and current occupation (3-digit). There 
are legal sanctions for misreporting and therefore we can expect a good 
reliability of the administrative data. The employment statistics register 
covers more than 90 percent of all employees in manufacturing and 75 
percent in the service sector. Freelancers, civil servants, self employed 
persons and workers with earnings below a minimum level are not eligible 
to the social security system and therefore not included in the individual 
data. However, it is possible to obtain such information from the IAB-
Establishment-Panel on the aggregate level of establishments. 
The IAB-Establishment-Panel is a survey conducted since 1993. For the 
panel a stratified sample is drawn from the establishments included in the 
employment statistics register following the principle of optimum stratifi-
cation according to the stratification cells of the establishment size class 
(10 categories) and the industry (16 categories1). These stratification cells 
are also used for the weighting of the sample. To correct for panel attri-
tion, exits, and newly founded units, the samples are augmented regu-
larly. This leads to an unbalanced panel. The attrition of the largest plants 
can only be corrected by an increasing number of smaller, but neverthe-
less large plants. Also on the demand side of the labour market we can 
expect a good reliability of the data, because the data are conducted via 
oral and structured interviews. Reliability checks improve the quality of 
the establishment level data. 
To illustrate the effect of the weighting procedure for the establishment 
data, table 1 shows weighted and unweighted values of selected variables. 
In principle smaller establishments are sampled with a lower probability so 
that weighting increases their proportion. 
The increase in the share of part-time workers is mostly driven by the ris-
ing participation rate of females in the labour market. Fixed-term con-
tracts are distributed more equally between males and females. It should 
be noted that full time jobs are partly substituted by part time jobs mean-
ing that there is often a negative growth of full time jobs on the plant 
level. 
                                                
1 From 2000 onwards the stratification is done according to 20 industries. 
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Table 1: Weighted and unweighted values of selected variables 
  percentage of …… 
  part-time workers fixed-term contracts blue-collar workers 
unweighted        
1993 .09 .02 .36 
1995 .17 n.a.  .38 
2000 .20 .08 .43 
weighted        
1993 .13 .03 .40 
1995 .22 n.a.  .43 
2000 .28 .09 .36 
n.a. : not applicable 
Sources: IAB-Establishment-Panel. 
 
The Linked-Employer-Employee-Data of the IAB (LIAB) are constructed by 
merging the IAB-Establishment-Panel with the data of the employment 
statistics register using the administrative plant identifier. There are sev-
eral versions of the LIAB data. We use for the most parts of this study the 
first version of the LIAB cross-sectional model. This dataset contains the 
employment spells of those persons employed in one of the establish-
ments covered by the IAB establishment panel. Since the reference date 
of the questions in the IAB establishment panel is the end of June of each 
year, only those spells are included in the individual data which cover June 
30th. An overview about the LIAB, the data models and the several ver-
sions, is given by Alda/Bender/Gartner (2005), further details are de-
scribed in Data-Reports (Alda, 2005b-e). Appendix A 1 gives a short de-
scription of the two kinds of datasets which associate to the LIAB data and 
informs over applicable information which can be obtained with these 
data. 
The cross-sectional LIAB contains the duration of employment spells on an 
annual basis. This allows the identification of movers and stayers as well 
as computing job tenure and the employees’ change in wages if we use a 
balanced panel2. We constructed the tenure variable by checking whether 
                                                
2 To describe this in more detail: first, identify plants, which are in t and t-1 part of the 
panel. Second, identify employees, who are observed in t and t-1 (=stayers). Third, 
identify workers with only one observation (in t: entries; in t-1: exits). For the first 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 18/2005   
 
8
an employee in t appears also in the same plant in t-n (n∈ N). With larger 
n we have less plant observations due to panel attrition. Therefore we cal-
culate only the job duration categories for at least one year, two years 
and three years. For some additional analysis we switch to another LIAB 
version: the first version of the LIAB longitudinal model. There, job dura-
tions can be computed on a daily precise base (left censored at January, 
1st, 1990). By merging other years, the job tenure information can only be 
roughly computed in the LIAB cross-sectional model. Furthermore, there 
we cannot observe employees after they have left a plant. It follows that 
we are not able to compute the change in wages for workers who change 
their employer in this data model3. 
The plant size is constructed by aggregating the number of workers cov-
ered by the social insurance system in the employment statistics register. 
We include in the analysis only plants with at least 25 employees in t, 
where part-time workers, apprentices and workers not covered by the so-
cial insurance system do not count. 
The obtained wages for employees are in general gross wages including all 
bonus payments. The information about wages is censored, because pay-
ments for the social security system are limited to a certain amount. More 
precise, wages in the employment register are left truncated and right 
censored. While the left truncation refers to workers with only a few work-
ing hours, the right censoring is more important, because this affects es-
pecially our descriptive wage statistics. The censoring varies from year to 
year. For example in the year 2000 it amounts to a gross monthly wage of 
3427 Euros. Thus the threshold is the highest observable wage in the re-
spective year. 
The right censoring of the wage variable has implications on the distribu-
tion of wages and therefore for our wage statistics. To correct this, we im-
                                                                                                                                                     
year of the panel 1993 we identify the stayers directly with the data of the employ-
ment statistics register. We got from the data holders the requested information about 
employees by delivering the plant identifiers. This is the reason why we have the 
highest number of observations in 1993.  
3 We can only observe employees who move to plants that are also part of the IAB-
Establishment Panel. We call this hereafter IAB-Turnover. But the IAB-Turnover is too 
small for calculating the change in wages for persons changing their employer. 
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pute censored wages with predicted values using a Mincerian earnings 
function augmented by ten sector and ten occupation dummies4. Varying 
from year to year eight to fifteen percent of all observations are imputed. 
In the group of employees with a university degree 50 % of all observa-
tions are censored.  
From the employment statistics the working time is available only on a 
rough basis, which differs between full- and part-time workers. Further-
more, employers classify full-time workers by their working conditions 
customary in the respective establishment. Part-time workers and switch-
ers from part-time to full-time (and opposite) are as well as apprentices5 
excluded from all of the analyses. All descriptive statistics about wage, 
wage changes and mobility presented in Appendix 3 are based on continu-
ing workers in continuing plants. Appendix A 2 gives an overview for all 
the key variables (and their definitions) which we use in this study. 
3 Macroeconomic situation and institutional set-
ting in Germany 
In this section we give some information about the macroeconomic situa-
tion in Germany during the nineties and inform over – in our opinion – 
relevant German labour market institutions. We start in table 2 with the 
description of the West German GDP and unemployment during the nine-
ties to give reasons for our observation years. 
In the first years after the German Unification the West German economy 
benefited from the growing demand for goods and services in the former 
German Democratic Republic. The West German GDP grew substantially 
from 1990 to 1992, but not enough to lower or at least stabilize the un-
employment rate. Then, in 1993 there was a slump in economic activities. 
In 1994 and 1995 the GDP grew slightly. Since 1998 the GDP growth went 
hand in hand with a reduced unemployment rate. The peak of the GDP 
growth rate was reached in 2000 with 3 percent. Our time window is 
                                                
4 A similar imputation method is described by Gartner/Rässler (2005). We add also an 
error term to the estimated wage, but different to Gartner/Rässler we use a frequen-
tistic estimation instead of a bayesian estimation and do single imputation instead of 
multiple imputation. 
5 Apprentices work full-time and receive wages fixed by collective agreements. These 
wages are much lower even than those for unskilled blue collar workers. 
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- given the data from the IAB-Establishment-Panel - the period 1993 to 
2000. We decided to choose the years 1993, 1995 and 2000. 1993 is a 
slump year in the German economic activities, the year 2000 a compara-
tively boom year. We prepare also information about 1995, a year, in 
which the economic growth as well as unemployment remains almost sta-
ble. 
Table 2: Macroeconomic situation in West Germany 1991 to 2000 
Year GDP* 
growth 
GDP 
1 year 
unemployment
rate 
1991 1.567.693  .063 
1992 1.594.951 1,74% .066 
1993 1.557.562 -2,34% .082 
1994 1.578.491 1,34% .092 
1995 1.600.479 1,39% .093 
1996 1.607.803 0,46% .101 
1997 1.629.703 1,36% .110 
1998 1.664.769 2,15% .094 
1999 1.697.689 1,98% .088 
2000 1.749.554 3,06% .078 
* At constant 1995 prices in Mill. EUR, West Germany 
Source: German Central Statistical Office. 
 
Although we focus on the West German economy only, one should address 
the persistent high unemployment in East Germany (in 2000 about 17 
percent) as well as the extensive money transfers from West to East Ger-
many during our observation period. In the nineties there was an enor-
mous governmental program to adapt the East German Economy to the 
Western level. But still in 2001, the productivity level of the establish-
ments in the East German manufacturing sector for example is on average 
only 60 percent of the West German one (see Kölling/Rässler, 2004). All in 
all this leads to a strong trend of worker migration from East to West 
Germany. 
Labour market institutions in Germany 
The German system of vocational education is not the product of a single 
reform. It developed from pre-industrial apprenticeship roots and prevails 
not in Germany alone, but in similar fashion in Austria, Denmark and 
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Switzerland (cf. Winkelmann, 1997). The training duration is between two 
and three and a half years, so plants invest remarkable time and money in 
apprenticeship training. Although we decided to exclude apprentices from 
our analysis, it has to be stressed that the German system leads to a re-
duced mobility of employees especially in the group of young skilled blue 
collar workers in the first years after finishing their training because es-
tablishments try to amortize their human capital investment by means of 
longer job tenure of their trainees (Bender/Schwerdt, 2003). In several 
branches it is guaranteed by collective agreement that trainees can stay 
at least one year after the completing of their apprenticeship training in 
the firm. It is especially the mobility of younger blue collar workers which 
is hampered by the apprenticeship system.  
On the OECD-scale of rigidities and employment protection Germany 
ranks in the midfield (OECD, 1999). Despite the trend of deregulating the 
German labour market in the nineties, there are still several institutions 
which enforce the position of insiders. Outsiders have especially in prob-
lematic economic times only small chances to (re-)enter the (internal) la-
bour market. 
A fairly prominent example for the protection of insiders is the German 
Protection Against Dismissal Acts (PADA), that applies for all plants with 
more than five (between 1996 and 1998 and since 2004 for plants with 
more than ten) employees. It should be noted that the following sen-
tences concerning the PADA is more focussing on public and political 
discussions. In the field of application of the PADA, firms have to take into 
account for their dismissals fairness considerations to avoid social cases of 
hardship. As a result, especially young employees (workers with short job 
tenure) must be dismissed instead of others. Especially elder, married 
workers and workers with children are protected by this law. In all of the 
plants included in the analysis this law is valid. Thus we can expect that 
the mobility of individuals is mainly determined by (younger?) persons 
with shorter job durations (for an investigation of worker flows and dis-
missal protection see Bauer/Bender/Bonin, 2004 and Verick, 20046). 
                                                
6 Both investigations find no significantly different growth patterns for plants in which 
the PADA is valid and in which it is not. 
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Another notable institution is the set-up of works councils. They have a 
strong legal base in Germany. Lots of studies were made about the effect 
of works councils on the mobility of employees (f. e. Addison/Bellmann/ 
Schnabel/Wagner, 2004). Nearly all of them come to the conclusion that 
the mobility of workers is hampered by this institution. A works council is 
guaranteed by law in all plants with more than five employees, if the ma-
jority of the plants’ employees want to elect one (or keep him if he is still 
installed). In plants with more than 20 employees the works council must 
agree to dismissals. In case of mass dismissals, the regional labour office 
and the firms involved plants have to draft a social plan to avoid social 
cases of hardships, if possible. Especially in larger establishments works 
councils often exist in combination with collective agreements.  
Table 3 shows the coverage of works councils, collective agreements on 
firm or branch level7 and their combination in the years 1998 and 20028. 
Table 3: Works Councils and collective agreement: coverage on full-time 
employees in the West German private sector 
 coverage of 
collective agreement 
coverage of collective agree-
ment and works councils 
size class 1998 2002 1998 2002 
1 - 4 employees .46  .45 not possible not possible 
5 – 19 employees .65 .55 .05 .05 
20 – 99 employees .73 .62 .24 .29 
100 - 199 employees .79 .72 .60 .61 
200 – 499 employees .85 .81 .79 .76 
500 and more employees .96 .94 .95 .92 
Total .78 .71 .51 .48 
Source: IAB-Establishment-Panel 1998 and 2002, weighted values. 
 
The coverage of works councils and collective agreement on full time 
workers is in larger firms above 90 percent. Firms being member in an 
employers’ association can deviate from paying collectively agreed wages 
                                                
7 Approximately ten percent of all private establishments have wage arrangements on 
plant level (rising). 
8 In 1993 and 1995 the information are not applicable. We choose the years 1998 and 
2002 in order to show that especially the coverage of collective agreement over plants 
is (still) decreasing. 
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only by negotiating with the union on firm level, but nevertheless the 
branch union must agree to the result of the bargaining process. Firms 
who are not member in an employers’ association have no restrictions in 
setting wages. Hence, in Germany statutory minimum wages pay only 
firms in the construction sector. Tariff wages must be paid only for union 
members, but in fact such wages are very often paid to all employees in a 
firm. The coverage of collective agreement in manufacturing is higher 
than in the private service sector. Also the increase of bargained wage is 
often higher in manufacturing.  
Some plants pay more than negotiated wages, but in regular not for all of 
their workers. This additional payment increases the flexibility in setting 
wages in labour markets with rigid wage structures (Kohaut/Schnabel, 
2003a). In addition, centrally bargained wage arrangements cannot take 
into account all observed and unobserved heterogeneity of establishments 
and employees. It is possible to bargain wages on firm level, but unions 
have to agree if the employer is member of the employer association. In 
this perspective paying higher wages than fixed by collective agreements 
will cause larger wage dispersions within plants. Büttner/Fitzenberger 
(1998) show that wages being equal to collective arrangements occur 
mostly at the bottom end of the wage distribution. Paying more than fixed 
by collective agreement can be obtained especially for better jobs/work-
ers. However, the proportion of plants paying higher wages than bar-
gained is decreasing in our observation period (table 4). The effect of 
collective agreement on the wage structure, the dynamics and the mobil-
ity patterns will be investigated in the next section.  
Table 4 shows, how many plants pay more than collectively agreed wages. 
Paying wages in excess of collectively agreed wages is often the only op-
portunity for unionized plants to react also in terms of wages to a chang-
ing economic environment in the short-run9. 
                                                
9 In the year 1998 had 5 percent of all West German plants an employee participation in 
asset formation or share ownership (Möller, 2001). This form of payment – which can 
be also interpreted as firm flexibility in setting wages - covers about 15 percent of the 
total West German workforce. 
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Table 4: Summary statistics of payment in excess of collectively agreed 
wages 
  
  proportion mean 
standard 
deviation 10%-ile 90%-ile 
1993 .41 .134 .076 .05 .25 
1995 .32 .112 .073 .05 .20 
1998 .23 .111 .066 .05 .20 
2000 .27 .115 .071 .05 .20 
Source: IAB-Establishment-Panel 1993 – 2000, weighted values. 
 
The proportion of plants paying more than fixed by collective agreement 
decreases until 1998 and increases in 2000 but did not reach again the 
level of 1993. The margin for adjusting wages has therefore decreased 
during the nineties for plants covered by unions. Referring to all plants in 
Germany we can expect that wage structures might change in the second 
half of nineties more by means of worker mobility than the adjustment of 
wages. This process should be guided by the changing institutional frame 
for regulating working contracts where employers gain more flexibility 
since the second half of the nineties. 
4 Empirical findings 
With regard to what was said in the data section 2 we prepared the de-
scriptive statistics about wage, wage changes and mobility in Appendix 3 
twice, with weighted and unweighted values. We focus at least for the 
wage statistics on the unweighted results, because they are more precise. 
The weighted values give an impression how the over sampling of larger 
plants in the IAB-Establishment affect the results. All figures and tables 
for wages are calculated on a monthly base and always in Euros. We de-
flated with the official consumer price index (2000 = 100). Furthermore, 
we complement our analyses with variance decompositions and assess the 
effect of collective agreement on wages and worker mobility via a non-
parametric matching approach. 
The sample is based on plants in the West German private sector. The 
IAB-Establishment-Panel allows distinguishing between the private and 
the public sector not only via the sector classification, but also via a ques-
tion for the ownership of plants. Base for the analysis are all plants with a 
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private ownership and at least 25 full time employees in the respective 
year. 
We use for the study the LIAB cross-sectional model, version 1 and the 
LIAB longitudinal model, version 1. While we restrict the cross-sectional 
model to plants in the private sector and those who have at least 25 full-
time employees in the respective years, the analyses based on the LIAB 
longitudinal model covers all plants including the public sector with at 
least three full time employees in the time period 1996 to 2001. The lon-
gitudinal model allows us to make additional analyses, which are not pos-
sible with cross-sectional data, in especial computing daily precise job du-
rations (left censored at January, 1st, 1990). Consequently the results for 
the average wage and other statistics differ slightly between the two data 
models. All key variables and definitions (Appendix A 2) are - if applica-
ble - the same in both data models. 
4.1 Structure of wages within and between plants 
In this section we are discussing how German wages develop on the plant 
and worker level during the nineties. Figure 1 shows the Kernel densities 
of the workers’ log wage distribution10 in the years 1993, 1995 and 2000 
and Figure 2 the distribution of the firm average wage for the same years. 
Figure 1 and 2: German workers’ and plants’ wage distribution in 1993, 1995 
and 2000 
 
          Figure 1      Figure 2 
Source: LIAB cross sectional model, version 1. 
 
                                                
10 We cut off all censored wages for figure 1. 
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The distribution of workers’ wages shifted to the right meaning that the 
weight of the higher wages has increased. Especially the contrast between 
the distributions for the years 1993 and 2000 is very clear, whereas the 
distribution in the year 1995 is lying between these. In the distribution of 
firm average wage the proportion of higher values has increased since 
1993. Also on the plant level we obtain for the average wage a slight shift 
to the right meaning that we have in Germany in the year 2000 more high 
and low wage plants than in 1993. Appendix table A 3.1 shows that the 
standard deviation of the employees' and plants' average wage increases 
in our observation period which is a different manifestation of the same 
process. Workers and plants became in Germany more unequal regarding 
their wages during the nineties. The results from the matching approach 
(first two statistics in Appendix table A 7) show only in 1995 a significant 
wage compression for firms covered by collective contracts. In the other 
years there is no significant difference between firms with and without col-
lective agreement11. At least three different interpretations are possible: 
First, firms without collective agreement react more flexible in boom or 
slump years to a changing economic environment while in stable years 
they compress the wage structure within firms. Second, unions change 
their policy during the nineties and allow a wider wage dispersion between 
employees (f. e. because of more collective agreement on firm than on 
branch level). Third, employers might have restricted the payment of col-
lectively agreed wages to union members12. 
From table A 3.1 we can also derive that the higher standard deviation is 
mostly driven by the more dynamic development at the upper bound of 
wages on individual and plant level. This holds especially for the 90%-ile 
of both wage distributions. On individual level there is a wage growth dur-
ing the observation period in all quartiles and deciles, on plant level the 
                                                
11 A grate part of the establishments (for example in 1999 more than 55 percent) in the 
dataset that are not covered by collective contracts orientate their wage payments on 
the collectively bargained wages. This could be an explanation why we find only small 
differences between unionized and non-unionized plants 
12 This seems unlikely, because then the employer would create incentives for his em-
ployees to become union member (Kohaut/Schnabel, 2003b). But unions in Germany 
have fewer members in 2000 compared to 1993. Another argument is that equal 
workers should be paid equal due to fairness considerations. Wage differentials within 
firms should be accepted by the employees (Stephan, 2001). 
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average wage decreases in the year 2000 compared to 1995 from the 
75%-ile on downwards. While at the upper bound of the plants' wage dis-
tribution workers became more different concerning their wages (column 
average standard deviation of plants' average wage), workers at the bot-
tom of the wage distribution are paid more equal within these plants. The 
average standard deviation of plants' average wage is about 30 percent of 
the average wage meaning that still a bulk of wage variation in the Ger-
man economy is within firm, not between firms, but the latter becomes 
more important at the end of the observation period. The distribution of 
the individual wage shifted to the right that is the weight of the higher 
wages has increased. In the distribution of firms’ average wage, the pro-
portion of higher values has increased since 1993. Especially the contrast 
between the distributions for the years 1993 and 2000 is very clear, 
whereas in 1995 the distribution lies between these. 
Regarding their wages the group of workers aged 25 to 30 and the group 
of workers aged 45 to 50 exhibits a similar development (Appendix table 
3.1). The development of their wages (relative to their level) is nearly the 
same. Again, the wages at the upper bound of the wage distribution in-
creased much more than at the lower bound. 
The higher wages for persons aged 45 to 50 are not only based on the fact 
that larger plants pay higher wages and employee elder workers. The cor-
relation between the log size and the average age of workers in plants is 
0.111 in 1993, 0.026 in 1995 and 0.02 in 2000 (all coefficients are signifi-
cant on the 5 percent level). More detailed analyses with wage regressions 
show that one year elder is ceteris paribus corresponding to a higher wage 
return rate for workers aged 30 of 2.8 percent (aged 40: 1.6 percent; 
aged 50: 0.4 percent) in the time period 1996 to 2001. Between the aver-
age tenure and the firm size there is a closer relationship: the log size cor-
relates with the average tenure on plant level in the year 1996 with 0.375 
and in 2000 with 0.284 (1993, 1995 not applicable). One interpretation of 
this result is that larger plants keep their workers with longer job duration 
more in stable or slump years (if we interpret the year 1996 as one) and 
less in boom years. Another is simply that large firms grow in boom 
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years13. We have to leave here open, whether the weaker correlation in 
2000 is also corresponding with worker mobility mostly driven by employ-
ers or the respective employees (we come back to this point by discussing 
the mobility results). However, more detailed analyses show that the av-
erage wage return for one additional year of job duration is c. p. 2.1 per-
cent in the time period 1996 to 2001. 
Using data sets linking employees’ and employers’ information allows 
computing the proportion of the variance of wages related to human capi-
tal endowment and to firm-specific effects (Groshen, 1991, 1996); 
Stephan, 2001). Table 5 shows the coefficient of determination R² which 
can be attributed to human capital, firm-specific effects and their interac-
tion within a Mincerian earnings function. 
Table 5: Analysis of Variance for workers’ wage levels 
                                   R² 1993 1995 2000 
Firm effects 0.273 0.284 0.347 
Human capital 0.448 0.445 0.386 
Human capital +  firm effects 0.587 0.586 0.595 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional, version 1; based on plants with at least 25 full-time  
employees in the respective years. 
 
For the years 1993 to 2000 a clear trends emerge: The importance of the 
firm-specific effect increases, whereas that of the human capital effect de-
creases. The R² related to the interaction of firm-specific and human capi-
tal effects remains almost stable over that time period. These results fit 
very well to those obtained from the descriptive analyses of the structure 
of wages within and between plants. 
Wages and within plant variance have a positive correlation in the German 
data (Appendix table 3.1). Of course, larger plants pay higher wages and 
use a wider range of different occupations, but the raising within variance 
of wages in the observation period can only be partly explained by a wider 
                                                
13 This seems unlikely. A comparison of the weighted and unweighted values in appendix 
table 3.5 shows that the employment growth in 2000 is ‘larger’ (in the sense of a less 
negative growth) in smaller establishments. 
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range of occupations14. Occupations are differently affected by sorting ef-
fects and unobserved components of human capital. We run wage regres-
sions with the LIAB longitudinal data in order to show how this influence is 
shaped15. The first regression model is constituted only by dummies Bit for 
the occupational group and covariates xit characterizing persons (like job 
tenure, their education level, the job experience and many others). The 
second model uses in addition the time-variant plant characteristics wjt 
(like their reorganization activities, the existence of a works council and/or 
collective agreement, worker flow characteristics (i.e. churning) and oth-
ers16). In these two models yearly data from 1996 to 2001 are pooled in 
the wage regressions. Model 3 captures additionally unobserved hetero-
geneity for plants θi and persons ψj . With yit as the log-wage the three 
models are given by:17
(i)  yit = µ + xitβ + Bitζ + εit
(ii)  yit = µ + xitβ + Bitζ + wjtγ + εit
(iii)  yit = µ + xitβ + Bitζ + wjtγ  +  θi  + ψj + εit . 
In model (iii) we sweep out the unobserved plant and person level hetero-
geneities by subtracting averages on the spell level (which is each unique 
worker-plant combination). A short description of this ‘Spell-Fixed-Effect’ 
regression gives Appendix A 6. Abowd/Kramarz/Margolis (1999), hereafter 
AKM, discuss this model in section 3.3., but they use differences rather 
than mean deviations. However, we are here interested in the change of 
the ζ-coefficients for the vector of occupation groups. All regressions use 
in addition ten covariates for person and 21 for plant characteristics. The 
wage regressions are based on 2,282,926 full time worker years corre-
                                                
14 This shows also table A 3.5: plants use less occupations at the end of our observation 
period than at the beginning. The nearly unchanged weighted values for the observed 
time period show that only larger plants reduced their number of occupations. 
15 Therefore the 3-digit occupational code is recoded into ten occupational groups, which 
are not directly comparable to international classifications (ISCO-88 would be possible 
with the applicable 3-digit code). The grouping is done in order to downsize the wide 
range of occupations. 
16 The variables for model (i) and (ii) are comparable to the z-variables used in 
Abowd/Kramarz/Margolis, (1999). The observable covariates for the models (i) to (iii) 
are listed in Appendix A 4. 
17 Symbols and indices are listed in appendix A 5. 
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sponding to 673,606 persons in the observation period 1996 to 2001.  
Table 6 shows the results only for the occupational groups. 
Table 6: ζ-Coefficients for occupational groups using different regression 
techniques 
 West Germany 1996 to 2001 
 coefficients from model ... 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
    
unskilled manual occupations reference 
skilled manual occupations 0.196 0.146 0.019 
technicals, engeneers 0.293 0.284 0.058 
unskilled service occupations n.s. - 0.004 n.s. 
skilled service occupations 0.148 0.045 0.031 
semi-professionals 0.303 0.146 0.059 
professionals 0.467 0.342 0.100 
unskilled civil servant occupations 0.058 0.047 0.003 
skilled civil servant occupations 0.262 0.223 0.048 
managers 0.458 0.426 0.127 
notes: uses 2.28 million yit-observations; all reported coefficients are significant on a  
          level of α < 0.01 (n.s.: not significant); models are explained in the text 
Source: LIAB longitudinal model, Version 1 for 1996 to 2001. 
 
Compared to model 3 - which sweeps out the heterogeneities - the ob-
served plant characteristics have often just small effects on the return 
rates for the occupation groups. The sorting effects are identified via the 
change of the zeta-coefficients. The more the specific occupation group is 
– relative to the unskilled manual occupations – sorted into observable 
high wage firms, the more is the decrease of the zeta-coefficient of model 
(ii) compared to model (i). The interpretation of the differences between 
the zeta-coefficients from model (ii) and (iii) is quite the same. The more 
the observable covariates are (positive) correlated with the unobserv-
ables, the larger is the decrease of the zeta-coefficient in model (iii) com-
pared to model (ii). 
Exceptions of only small observable firm effects are for example the skilled 
service occupations. Such employees work more often in high wage plants 
and here the unobserved worker and plant characteristics have just a 
small effect on the wage return rates in this occupational group. Also 
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(semi-)professionals are - in contrast to the unskilled manual occupa-
tions - more likely to be sorted in observable high wage plants, but here 
the unobservable workers and plant characteristics are more important 
than for skilled service occupations. To summarize, once controlled for 
unobserved plant and worker characteristics there are often only small 
wage differential between different occupational groups. Thus we can con-
clude that plants set wages not (only) by occupations but for (other) ob-
served and unobserved person and plant characteristics. 
To investigate this further table 7 shows the correlations of the observed 
and unobserved workers’ and firms’ characteristics. 
Table 7: Correlation of observed and unobserved wage components 
 θˆ i ψj βˆitx  γˆjtw  
θˆ i 1,0000    
ψj -0,0960 1,0000   
βˆitx  0,3787 0,0002 1,0000  
γˆjtw  -0,0276 -0,2376 0,0417 1,0000 
notes: uses 673,606 averages on the level of persons, based on   
 2,282,926 yit-observations; symbols and indices explains  
 Appendix A 5 
Source: LIAB longitudinal model, Version 1 for 1996 to 2001. 
 
Like in many countries18 corr( ,ψ) = - 0.0960 has the wrong sign if one 
expects that unobservably 'good' employers have unobservably 'good' 
workers
θˆ
19. It is especially the correlation between ψ and γˆjtw  that looks 
                                                
18 Abowd/Creecy/Kramarz (2002) reports a strong negative correlation of – 0.283 for the 
French and – 0.025 for Washington State data. Goux/Maurin (1999) estimate (de-
pending on the time period) + 0.01 to – 0.32. Gruetter/Lalive (2003) report – 0.543 
for Austrian data and Barth/Dale-Olsen (2003) – 0.47 to – 0.53 for Denmark. 
19 Andrews/Schank/Upward (2004) report for Germany a correlation of nearly zero  
(-0.0172) in the time period 1993 to 1997 with comparable LIAB data, but less and 
different covariates. One reason for their weak correlation is that they did not use in-
dividual characteristics which describe their labour market behaviour (f. e. times of 
unemployment and leave of absence for family phases). These covariates are positive 
correlated with the unobserved person effects (meaning that the higher the integra-
tion in the labour market and the less there are events and times of unemployment, 
the higher is the unobserved person effect on wages). The correlation with the vector 
of covariates referring to labour market integration and the unobserved person effect 
θi is + 0.1526). 
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somewhat awry20. Observed and unobserved worker characteristics have a 
strong positive correlation meaning that high skilled workers also accumu-
late high unobserved person effects for which employers pay higher 
wages. The correlation of the observed plant characteristics with the ob-
served and unobserved worker characteristics is weak, meaning that ig-
noring the one side of the labour market nearly has no effect on the re-
sults for the other. This holds especially for the standard errors. As shown 
for the occupation groups in table 6, the return rates for observable work-
ers’ characteristics sometimes change to a not neglectable amount by 
controlling for observed and unobserved plant characteristics. Referring to 
the unobserved worker heterogeneities, further investigations show that 
unobservably 'good' workers are more likely to sort into larger plants, in 
plants which reduce hierarchies and increase workers’ responsibilities, in 
plants which have less turnover and those who are tied by collective 
agreement on plant level21. 
4.2 Wage dynamics 
The statistics for the wage dynamics are printed in Appendix A 3.3 and 
A 3.4. Figure 3 shows the kernel densities for the change in wages on in-
dividual, figure 4 on plant level. 
Figures 3 and 4: Change in log wages on worker and plant level 
 
       figure 3      figure 4   
Source: LIAB cross sectional model, version1. 
 
                                                
20 The reason might be too little turnover between the plants in the sample. 
21 If plants pay wages by collective agreement on branch level, the averages of the un-
observed person effects on plant level are smaller, but nevertheless higher than in 
plants not covered by unions. Hence, the wage regressions control for the observable 
average effect of collective agreement on plant and branch level. 
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The change in wage for workers (figure 3) gives no clear picture as well as 
the change of the plants' average wage. Both distributions shift to the 
right from 1993 to 1995. Between 1995 and 2000 there is a slight shift to 
the left. The peak of the density function changes for individuals meaning 
that workers became in 1995 (and 2000) more unequal regarding their 
wage change. On plant level the peaks are in all years nearly on the same 
level. 
German plants offer a wide range of change in wages to their workers. 
There is also a wide range of within variation in the change in wages 
which increases during the observation period. The 90/10-ratio of the 
standard deviation of the change in plants' average wage is 2.383 in the 
year 1993, 2.545 in 1995 and 2.814 in the year 2000. There are two in-
terpretations possible. First, the (rising) wage growth rate differences 
might match wage level differences. Maybe the wages in human capital 
intensive plants grew very fast while wages remain nearly unchanged in 
non-intensive plants. A tied argument is that heterogeneous plants have a 
large mixture of skills. Then there would be a high variance of wage 
growth rates within plants and little variation in the means across plants. 
Second the growth rates differences might reflect institutional differences. 
This could be unions or industries. Unionized environments for instance 
might compress wages as well as their growth rates, while others do not. 
In the perspective of our matching approach (Appendix A 7) the second 
explanation is less important. Plants with and without collective agree-
ment differ not significantly in their average change in wages in any year. 
Only the coefficient of variation in the change in wages is in 1995 signifi-
cantly lower in unionized plants. However, depending on the year the 
standard deviation of the change in plants' average wage is twice to fourth 
as high as the average change in wage. Further analyses are needed to 
interpret this. 
From the rough tenure variable in the LIAB cross-sectional model (Appen-
dix 3.3) we can deduce no clear interpretation for the results. If wages 
grow different in heterogeneous plants the average change in wages for 
workers is not a good indicator for what drives this development. The high 
standard deviations support this argument. Looking at the rough tenure 
variable we find that in all quartiles and deciles the growth rates for work-
ers with shorter job durations appear in a better light. In table 8 we inves-
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tigate this further by looking at the change in wages using the LIAB longi-
tudinal model due to a more precise classification of the tenure variable. 
Table 8: Change in monthly wages (in Euro) by job tenure in the years 1999 
to 2001 
 Males females 
 1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001 
       
all employees 126.75 54.51 46.03 86.64 35.93 24.62 
tenure    less than one year 88.08 - 5.82 - 9.19 47.25 37.75 40.09 
one to two years 178.93 99.14 99.51 97.52 91.63 64.62 
two to three years 150.89 130.96 95.27 49.41 65.12 56.26 
three to four years 158.46 95.35 116.11 87.93 41.84 58.05 
four to five years 97.17 86.50 67.76 62.83 50.19 28.90 
five and more years 125.64 89.08 72.00 67.60 28.60 17.54 
Source: LIAB longitudinal model, version 1. 
 
We distinguish between males and females. The reason for this is that 
- despite that males have on average higher wage growth rates than fe-
males, which is not our issue here - we can observe a fairly clear trend for 
male workers. An entrance cohort at a certain time can be identified by 
diagonals. Each year an entrance cohort is going one group downwards 
until they finally reach the group with a job duration over five years. The 
male entrance cohort 1997/98 (this is the category tenure one to two 
years in the year 1999) has in all years the highest growth rates relative 
to all other groups in the respective years. It follows that wage growth 
rates are also joined with the date of entrance in a plant and therefore 
maybe in addition depending on the (macro-)economic conditions at a 
certain time. The latter will be different in heterogeneous plants. Rising 
wage differentials (wage growth rates) between otherwise equal workers 
(f. e. regarding their skills or occupation) within plants are also a conse-
quence of their date of entrance by the employer. Between firms are rising 
wage differentials for equal workers (now including their job tenure) a re-
sult of firms’ heterogeneities. In other words: at a fixed time point is the 
same economic environment good (regarding their wages) for workers in 
the one plant and not so good for equal workers in another plant.  
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In table 9 we would like to know in addition, how much of the variance of 
the change in wage of workers is explained by firms' fixed effect and by 
occupation. 
Table 9: Adjusted R² for occupation and firm effects on the change  
in workers’ log wages 
 adjusted R² for change in log wages 
 1993 1995 2000 
    
occupation1 0.1801 0.1383 0.1689 
firm 0.0856 0.1275 0.1341 
occupation1 plus firm 0.2171 0.2214 0.2474 
note: 1 3-digit; about 330 occupations 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model, version 1. 
 
In 1993 the occupation has a much larger effect on the change in wages 
meaning that firms set wages more by occupations than by their own het-
erogeneities. In the year 1995 there is nearly no difference between these 
two specific effects on the change in employees’ wages. In the year 2000 
wages are more set by occupations and plants compared to 1995. The 
plant effect became higher during the observation period which is roughly 
an equal development like in table 5 meaning that the firm heterogenei-
ties became more important for the workers’ development of wages. For 
the occupation effect on the change in wages is not a clear time trend 
emerging. However, in each year the occupation explains better the vari-
ance in the change of wages for workers than the firm, where the latter 
becomes more important during the observation period.  
The analysis of table 9 allows us to come back to the interpretation that 
firm heterogeneities are more important for the change of worker wages 
within specific entrance cohorts. Table 10 repeats the analyses of variance 
of table 9 by holding the entrance cohort constant22. 
                                                
22 The results of table 9 and 10 are not directly comparable because we have to switch 
between the LIAB data models.  
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 18/2005   
 
26
Table 10: Adjusted R² for occupation and firm effects on the change in work-
ers' log wages by tenure 
 adjusted R² of ANOVA for change in workers log wages 
 occupation firm firm plus occupation
entrance cohort 1997 2000 1997 2000 1997 2000 
       
1999 / 2000 - 0.209 - 0.266 - 0.381 
1998 / 1999 - 0.110 - 0.183 - 0.228 
1997 / 1998 - 0.121 - 0.174 - 0.240 
1996 / 1997 0.216 0.141 0.232 0.143 0.328 0.227 
1995 / 1996 0.129 0.135 0.186 0.157 0.235 0.222 
1994 / 1995 0.151 0.125 0.178 0.158 0.254 0.230 
1993 / 1994 0.159 0.107 0.157 0.145 0.234 0.207 
1992 / 1993 0.144 0.146 0.185 0.172 0.233 0.247 
1991 / 1992 0.123 0.145 0.134 0.147 0.202 0.241 
1990 / 1991 0.127 0.141 0.149 0.169 0.210 0.231 
1990 and earlier 0.115 0.114 0.093 0.137 0.175 0.203 
Source: LIAB longitudinal model, version 1. 
 
For most of the entrance cohorts - especially for the later ones - the pic-
ture compared to table 9 changed. As suggested by discussing table 8, 
now the firm explains for employees with shorter durations better the 
variance of the change in their wages. Only for workers with job durations 
of more than eight years in 1997, the occupation is better in predicting 
the change in wages than the firm. Comparing the observation points we 
have the same picture as for many other statistics: in 2000 the firm ef-
fects are more important than in 1997 and the human capital (here ap-
proximated by occupation) can explain less of the variance (here the 
change of workers wages). The combination of the occupation and the 
firm shows that they explain in the year 2000 for earlier entrance cohorts 
more of the wage change variance than in 1997. To conclude, wage 
growth rates are joined with the date of entrance by the employer. This 
confirms the hypotheses that firms have a large mixture of skills and so 
there is a lot within variance of the change in wages and less variation in 
the means across firms.  
4.3 Mobility patterns 
In this section the issue is on exit and entry rates on the establishment 
level. The differences between weighted and unweighted values are more 
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important, because smaller and larger plants differ in their mobility pat-
terns. If we speak in this section about larger plants we always refer to 
unweighted values, otherwise we mean all plants in Germany. Weighted 
values analyze the mobility for the typical German plant, unweighted val-
ues reflect more the worker flows in larger plants. Growth rates are com-
puted as 2(Nt – Nt-1)/(Nt+Nt-1) with N as the total number of full-time 
workers in plant i. Entry and exit rates were quite similar constructed as 
2Et/(Nt+Nt-1). E is the total number of exits or entries on plant level. The 
correlation statistics are always computed with the log of the (average, 
change in, standard deviation of) establishment level wages. 
Panel A: All jobs 
In Appendix table A 3.5 we prepare the results for all jobs. As mentioned 
in section 2, we have in 1993 nearly all larger establishments existing in 
Germany in our sample. Referring to full time jobs, the decreasing firm 
size in the unweighted results is partly a result from sample attrition. The 
weighted values correct for this selectivity. The large firm size and the 
large standard deviation of the firm size in the unweighted results com-
pared with the weighted results are reflecting the oversampling. However, 
according to other studies especially larger German plants became smaller 
in the second half of the nineties, as in- and outsourcing activities became 
more important. With this background we observe a negative growth for 
full time jobs on the establishment level. As explained in section 2, this 
decline in the number of full-time jobs is often compensated by an in-
creasing number of part time jobs.  
The number of occupations declines during the period for larger plants by 
approximately 30 percent. This may be a result from the declining firm 
size, but could also reflect the old fashioned occupational classification 
system of the 70th, which is still valid even in our data of the year 2000. 
Occupations in the declining industrial sector are more microscopic classi-
fied than occupations in the expanding service sector. Last, but not least, 
plants sometimes really drive down their number of occupation due to 
concentrate on their core business. Wage regressions show that workers 
in plants with fewer occupations receive higher wages23. 
                                                
23 In the wage regressions an index is used by the number of different occupations di-
vided by the total number of employees times hundred. 
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The exit rate for all jobs rises from 0.19 to 0.23 in our observation period. 
These values are slightly higher than in Nordic counties, but still lower 
than in France or in Italy. The entry rate rises from 0.16 to 0.18. This is 
comparable with the Nordic countries. The rising entry and exit rates may 
be attributable to the flexibilization of the labour market institutions. Fur-
thermore, the exit rates are higher than the entry rates reflecting the de-
clining trend of (full time) employment in the nineties. In the perspective 
of our matching approach (Appendix table A 7), collective agreement re-
duces in turbulent economic times worker flows – no matter, if these are 
hirings or firings. Exit and entry rates in unionized plants are in the years 
1993 and 2000 significantly different (lower) from non-unionized plants. 
In our ‘stable’ year 1995 instead, the mobility patterns between these two 
types of plants show no significant differences 
As expected, the mobility patterns differ for high and low wage firms. Low 
wage firms have higher exit and entry rates than high wage firms. This 
seems to be consistent across all sizes. A clear time trend emerges only in 
2000 compared to the former years, where the workers mobility becomes 
higher. This has consequences for the percentage of core workers (per-
sons with job tenure over three years). There are less core workers in the 
year 2000 than in former years. Looking at the results of the propensity 
score matching, institutional guidance does not stop this. Unionized plants 
protect – compared to non-unionized plants - insiders in the years 1993 
and 1995 more than in 2000, where the difference between both groups 
of plants diminishes.  
The correlation of the exit and entry rates with the average wage in estab-
lishments is negative. This means that high wage firms have less often 
turnover in order to keep their human capital. But the correlation is get-
ting weaker at the end of the observation period. As expected, exit rates 
are lower and entry rates are higher if plants raise the wages for their 
workers. Table 8 shows that especially the new hires receive a higher 
change in wage. This suggests that growing firms raise wages to attract 
(new) workers. Firms with a wider range of wages have higher worker 
mobility shown by the positive correlation between the entry/exit rate and 
the standard deviation of the average wage. 
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Panel B: High-level jobs and Panel C: Low-level jobs 
The comparison of the results for all jobs, high-level and low-level jobs 
exhibits several differences. The definition of high and low level jobs is 
based on the occupational classification (on a 3-digit level). High level jobs 
are above the 80 percentile of the wage distribution, if occupations are 
ranked by their median wage. Low level jobs are below the 20 percentile. 
So we focus now on the extremes. 
High and low level jobs are a matter of larger establishment meaning that 
both kinds of jobs create big differences in the number of employees be-
tween weighted and unweighted values. As expected, high wage earners 
have less mobility in high wage firms and more in low wage firms (low 
level jobs vice versa). In all kind of plants the exit and entry rates for low 
level jobs are higher than for high level jobs, consistent with predictions of 
human capital theory. For the low level jobs, the entry rate in 2000 is 
higher than the exit rate - suggesting an expanding sector of low wage 
jobs in Germany. 
High wage firms have lower exit and entry rates of high level jobs and 
higher exit and entry rates for low level jobs. If high wage firms can be 
regarded as high human capital firms, they have little reason for a high 
turnover. The correlation between the average wage change and the entry 
rates is for both kinds of jobs negative in 1995 and positive in 2000. If we 
suggest that firms grow in boom years, then these firms raise their wages 
to attract workers. A supporting argument is our result of table 8. Espe-
cially the change in wages for the new hires (with job duration of one to 
three years) is higher than for employees with longer job tenure. 
Between the wage dispersion in a firm and the exits and entry rates the 
results for the high level jobs are more complicated. For high and low level 
jobs we observe with only one exception (entry rate of high level jobs in 
1993) lower turnover if firms have a compressed wage structure. We can 
expect this result for the low level jobs. As said in section 3, especially 
jobs at the lower bound of wages are often protected against downward 
mobility and empirical investigations show that this is more often the case 
in firms with compressed wage structures. But high wage earners leave 
more often firms with compressed wage structures (table 11). 
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Table 11: Exit rates for top, middle and bottom earners 
 1993 1995 2000 
    
90%-ile wage (top earners) 0.133 0.131 0.178 
median-wage (middle earners) 0.129 0.118 0.158 
10%-ile wage (bottom earners) 0.232 0.219 0.283 
exit-90%-ile wage (compressed) 0.139 0.145 0.211 
exit-90%-ile wage (spread out) 0.126 0.116 0.142 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model, Version 1. 
 
There are two differences between the Appendix tables A 3.6/A 3.7 and 
table 11. First, for calculating the top, middle24 and bottom earners we do 
this not via the use of the median wage of occupations. The wage distribu-
tion therefore differs when calculating deciles (or quintiles). Second, there 
might be a difference between the 80%-ile and the 90%-ile. However, ta-
ble 11 shows that middle earners are the group with the most stable em-
ployment. Their exit rates are lower than for the extremes leading to the 
conclusion that this is an effect of the strong (insider) position of skilled 
blue collar workers resulting from the apprenticeship system in Germany. 
Especially the wages for skilled blue collar workers are fixed by collective 
agreements and unemployment for this skill group is not very high mean-
ing that also those firms which are not covered by unions have often to 
pay tariff wages if they require these skills. So there are no incentives for 
blue collar workers – who are the majority of middle earners – to change 
their employer. The mobility of bottom earners is often induced by the 
employer, while top earners more often exit from firms with a compressed 
wage structure25 suggesting that they quit more often seeking their 
chance elsewhere. 
5 Summary and outlook 
The West German Private Sector is characterized by a rising inequality of 
the payments of employees and the wages employers offer. While firms 
                                                
24 Middle wage earners are in the 45 to 55%-ile of the wage distribution. 
25 A compressed wage structure is defined for those plants, which are below the average 
90/50-ratio of the firm wage distribution, a spread out wage structure have firms, if 
their 90/50-ratio is above the average. 
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'start' in the year 1993 more representing a microcosm of the whole 
economy - meaning payments are more equally distributed between 
workers and firms - they 'end' in the year 2000 with higher wage differen-
tials on the individual and firm level meaning that firm heterogeneities be-
came more important for the setting and the within and between variation 
of wages in Germany during the nineties. There were a lot of reorganiza-
tion activities in German plants in the nineties. Outsourcing, new cus-
tomer-producer relationships and changes in the work organization were 
necessary for making firms more competitive. Such activities change the 
wage structure between and within plants. Wage structures in Germany 
are rather rigid and payment adjustments can be more expected via the 
mobility of workers. Skill biased technological change adversely affects 
both the risks of job loss and the wage development of different skill 
groups (f. e. Bauer/Bender, 2002; Kölling/Schank, 2002). The institutional 
frame of the German labour market can be described as more or less pro-
tecting insiders, but employers gain more flexibility in designing working 
contracts. All this is resulting in a large mixture of heterogeneous workers 
in heterogeneous plants, in the sense that some of them are more af-
fected by new developments than others at the same time. This leads to 
our observed rising inequality and larger wage dispersion. 
This key result for the structure of wages within and between firms is 
mostly driven by the more dynamic development at the upper bound of 
workers and firms’ wages. There is still a lot of wage variation within 
firms. The variation of wages between firms becomes more important dur-
ing our observation period 1993 to 2000 meaning that compared to the 
(observable) human capital firm effects became more important. In 1993 
there is a strong correlation between the firm size and the age of employ-
ees which nearly diminishes in 2000. More important is the tenure of 
workers meaning that holding workers is more a matter of job duration 
than age, and the latter does not necessarily reflect the former. 
The rising within variance of wages can only be partly explained by a 
change in firms' mixture of occupations26. They are differently affected by 
                                                
26 We estimate an average wage return rate for workers of c. p. one percent, if their 
employer drives down the  proportion of different occupations in his plant by five per-
cent (relative to all of his employees). 
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sorting effects and unobserved components of human capital. Once con-
trolled for unobserved firm and worker characteristics there are only small 
wage differentials between occupation groups meaning that German firms 
set wages not (only) by occupations but for other observed and especially 
unobserved human capital. Unobservably 'good' workers work more often 
in plants which reduce hierarchies, improve worker responsibilities and 
have fewer worker flows. The results are only sometimes affected by the 
coverage of collective agreement over plants. Unionized plants pay in 
2000 on average significantly higher wages and have in 1995 a more 
compressed wage structure, whereas in other years we find no significant 
differences between unionized and non-unionized plants.  
A decomposition of the variance of wages shows that the importance of 
the firm-specific effect increases, whereas that of the human capital effect 
decreases. The R² attributed to the interaction of both human capital and 
firm-specific effects remains almost stable during the years 1993 to 2000. 
Analyses of the wage dynamics in Germany show, that firms offer a wide 
range of change in wages. In general, workers with shorter job durations 
receive higher wage changes than workers with longer job durations. The 
range of the change in wage especial on individual level is getting wider 
during the nineties. The 90/10-ratio of the standard deviation of the 
change in plants average wage is 2.383 in 1993 and 2.814 in 2000, 
whereas the mean remains nearly unchanged. Referring to all employees 
it seems that firms set wages more by occupation, but wage growth rates 
are connected with the date of entrance by the employee. The same eco-
nomic environment affects differently in heterogeneous plants the wage 
dynamics on individual level. Once controlled for the date of entrance, the 
firm explains better than the occupation the change in wages for employ-
ees. For unionized plants we find nearly no significant differences to non-
unionized ones. Only in 1995 the coefficient of variation is smaller in 
plants covered by collective agreement meaning that the change in wages 
for workers is more compressed if wages are collectively bargained. 
From the figures for the mobility of employees we learn that in general 
there was more mobility in the second half of the nineties. We think that 
this effect is not only driven by the business cycle but also by a strong 
trend of deregulation in the formal institutional setting for working con-
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tracts in the German labour market. On the other hand several institutions 
tend to protect insiders. It can be concluded that a notable part of the 
higher mobility in the second half of the nineties was undertaken by a mi-
nority of employees, while (still) the majority of employees remained in 
stable employment. 
Such mobility patterns become also obvious in our Appendix tables A 3.5 
to A 3.7. While the entry rates in most cases grew moderately (but never-
theless there was more mobility), the exit rates become higher during the 
nineties. Despite that fact, stable employment is still normal in Germany. 
The protection of insiders became most obvious in the percentage of 
workers with duration of job tenure of more than three years. Especially in 
stable years the proportion of core (full-time) workers rises in German es-
tablishment. 
How can future work to our research issues be shaped? In our opinion the 
objective is at least twofold. The one perspective is focussing on data, the 
other on understanding the changes in the wage structure, the wage dy-
namics and the mobility patterns.  
The linked employer employee data from Germany, LIAB, make major 
steps forward. New technologies, in especial ICT, allow building up better 
datasets with a wider range of possible investigations. In the foreground is 
the association of the two LIAB-data models meaning integrating the 
working histories of persons in the cross-sectional model for all plants of 
the IAB establishment panel. Meanwhile, over ten thousand plants join the 
panel in West Germany and nearly 5000 in East Germany. Integrating key 
variables to the associated administrative individual data - like daily pre-
cise job durations, the wage of workers paid by the former employer, 
times of unemployment and many more - will make research with LIAB 
data not only easier, but also more fruitful. Many questions, which can at 
present only roughly be answered, will lead to new perspectives.  
For better understanding the structure and dynamics of wages and the 
mobility of employees in Germany, we would like to take a deeper look 
into the structure and dynamics of wages within plants in order to under-
stand what is happening between them. Maybe this should also include 
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plant closing and how newly found units develop over time27 with special 
attention given to the in- and outsourcing activities of (other) firms. What 
is the impact on the wage structure for the remaining staff? What follows 
for the mobility of workers in an economy? Such questions might give also 
a partial answer how internal labour markets change over time. Become 
workers more equal within plants and more different between plants?  
We would like to note that - and this seems to be consistent in a cross-
country comparison - unobservable worker and firm characteristics be-
come more important. They are correlated with the observables and 
maybe a key for understanding the wage dispersion as well as the sorting 
on (national) labour markets, in especial whether countries become more 
equal in labour market mechanisms.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A 1: Description of the data28
 
a) The IAB establishment panel (Betriebspanel) 
The IAB establishment panel covers in the period 1993 – present of plants 
located in West and 1996 – present in East Germany. Establishment are 
selected by using a fairly complicated weighting procedure. Unweighted 
the IAB establishment panel covers 1 percent of all plants (but nearly 
every larger one) and about 8 percent of all employees. Information on 
each establishment includes: 
− total employment 
− standard and overtime hours 
− wage recognition 
− output 
− exports 
− investment 
− urbanicity 
− ownership 
− technology (subjective measure) 
− organisational change 
− profitability  
− age of plants and whether parent is a single firm 
 
b) The employment statistic register (Beschäftigtenstatistik) 
For the other side of the labour market the IAB has access to the federal 
employment statistics register. It covers 1975 – present for West and 
1992 – present for the East Germany. It contains about 400 million re-
cords, covering about 46 million employees. Information on each worker 
includes 
− gender, age and nationality 
− start and end of every employment spell 
− occupation (3-digit) 
                                                
28 Andrews/Schank/Upward (2004), pp. 13-14. 
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− daily gross wages (left truncated and right censored) 
− qualifications (education/apprenticeship) 
− industry, region 
− establishment identification number 
− information about multiple jobs and times of unemployment 
By using the establishment identification number, the IAB is able to asso-
ciate each worker in the employment statistics register with an establish-
ment in the IAB establishment panel.  
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Appendix A 2: Variables and definitions 
 
Remark: For the structure of the linked-employer-employee-datasets of 
the IAB see the data sections in this article or IAB-Discussion-Paper 
No. 6/2005 (Alda/Bender/Gartner, 2005). Hereafter we describe how the 
applied key variables are computed and defined. 
wages 
Gross wages are applicable on a daily precise base. They are multiplied 
times 30.5 to get monthly wages. Wages are truncated at a lower bound 
and censored at an upper bound. Censored wages are imputed similar as 
described by Gartner/Rässler in IAB-Discussion-Paper No. 5/2005. After 
the imputation procedure we deflate all wages with the consumer price 
index (2000 = 100). All wages and statistics refer to full time employees. 
Wages are restricted to the interval of [500; 22026] Euros or in logs [5.5; 
10]. 
full time employees 
In the individual data are no information about the working hours, but if 
employees work the plant usual full-time hours or not. Apprenticeships are 
excluded from all analyses. 
movers 
We use in this paper the LIAB cross-sectional model. Movers can in this 
model only be identified, if they move to another plant, which is also part 
of the IAB-Establishment-Panel in the following year (we call this “IAB-
Turnover”). In the longitudinal model it is possible to follow the working 
history of persons. The correlations of observed and unobserved employer 
and employee characteristics are based on this first Version of the LIAB 
longitudinal model. 
tenure 
In the cross-sectional model it is only possible to check whether the indi-
vidual identifier occurs in three consecutive years. In the longitudinal 
model it is possible on a daily precise base to compute job durations (left 
censored at January, 1st, 1990). We use this information to report the cor-
relation of the firm size with the tenure variable.  
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sector classification 
We use the sector classification from the IAB-Establishment-Panel. It cov-
ers the whole German economy. We excluded all branches of the public 
sector and all services having a public ownership. In the manufacturing 
sector – which is a subpopulation of the whole sample – we exclude the 
agrarian sector as well as mining and construction plants (number of ob-
servations (plants) in remaining manufacturing: 1993: 1161; 1995: 915; 
2000: 730). 
mobility and growth rates 
All mobility rates are based on the formula 2*Et/(Nt-1 + Nt), where E is the 
event (entries, exits) and N is the total number of employees. This means 
for example that the exit rate of high level jobs is based on all exits of 
high level jobs times two divided by the sum of all existing high level jobs 
at time t and at time tt-1 .  Growth rates are quite similar constructed:  
2*(Nt  - Nt-1) / (Nt + Nt-1). 
high/low level jobs and top, middle, bottom earners 
For high and low level jobs we compute for each occupation (on a 3-digit 
level) the median wage. High level jobs are those jobs in the top 80 (low 
level bottom 20) decile of the wage distribution. 
For the definition of top, middle and bottom earners the occupation vari-
able is not used. Top earners are persons in the 90%-ile of the yearly 
wage distribution, bottom earners the 10%-ile and ‘middle’-earners em-
ployees in the 45%-55%-ile. 
coefficient of variation 
Constructed as r = σ/ | y | , where r is the coefficient, σ the standard de-
viation and y the (change in) wage on plant level. For the tables with the 
wage dynamics the coefficient of variation is much higher than for the 
structure of wages. In the tables for wage dynamics the coefficient is 
therefore divided by 100. 
size 
All size information used is based only on full time employees excluding 
apprenticeships. For analyses with the cross sectional LIAB we include 
only plants with at least 25 full-time employees and for the longitudinal 
LIAB data at least three. 
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switch rate 
The switch rate measures a change in the occupational code of a full-time 
employee between t and t-1 for all non-movers in a plant. 
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Appendix A 3: Tables of Wage, Wage Changes and Mobil-
ity Patterns 
Table A 3.1: Structure of wages within and between plants 
 monthly wages in Euros log monthly wages in Euros 
  1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
average wage, 
observation = a 
person 
3,089.97 3,187.36 3,314.24 7.989 8.018 8.052
  (median) 2,855.75 2,934.31 3,054.59 7.957 7.984 8.024
  (s.d.) 995.96 1,048.59 1,144.24 0.303 0.308 0.328
  (90%-ile) 4,438.33 4,606.65 4,844.97 8.398 8.435 8.486
  (75%-ile) 3,569.87 3,697.24 3,850.25 8.180 8.213 8.256
  (25%-ile) 2,408.41 2,469.87 2,543.85 7.787 7.811 7.841
  (10%-ile) 2,076.52 2,126.95 2,175.74 7.638 7.662 7.685
  [N – workers] 1,613,662 1,059,419 622,307 1,613,662 1,059,419 622,307
average of plant 
average wage, 
observ = a plant  
2,774.89 2,875.68 2,861.15 7.869 7.884 7.878
  (median) 2,758.07 2,845.02 2,820.62 7.890 7.895 7.897
  (s.d.) 557.49 601.23 677.69 0.213 0.220 0.251
  (90%-ile) 3,493.73 3,664.33 3,806.67 8.115 8.145 8.192
  (75%-ile) 3,144.38 3,263.71 3,251.82 8.021 8.037 8.038
  (25%-ile) 2,408.39 2,478.56 2,430.48 7.747 7.758 7.747
  (10%-ile) 2,078.78 2,145.13 2,007.83 7.589 7.611 7.547
  [N – firms] 2,163 1,709 1,578 2,163 1,709 1,578
average of s.d. of 
wages, observ = a 
plant 
790.99 818.24 829.83 0.267 0.266 0.274
  (median) 790.18 821.16 833.26 0.264 0.264 0.271
  (s.d.) 210.66 226.69 265.19 0.062 0.064 0.076
  (90%-ile) 1,061.06 1,113.54 1148.94 0.346 0.345 0.366
  (75%-ile) 929.03 973.55 1014.69 0.306 0.304 0.315
  (25%-ile) 648.77 663.67 657.91 0.226 0.225 0.225
  (10%-ile) 524.44 522.29 473.57 0.191 0.190 0.189
  [N – firms] 2,163 1,709 1,578 2,163 1,709 1,578
average Coefficient 
of variation of 
wages, observ = a 
plant) 
0.288 0.284 0.293 0.034 0.034 0.035
  (median) 0.286 0.286 0.291 0.033 0.033 0.034
  (s.d.) 0.067 0.071 0.081 0.008 0.009 0.010
  (90%-ile) 0.370 0.372 0.387 0.044 0.044 0.047
  (75%-ile) 0.329 0.327 0.339 0.039 0.039 0.040
  (25%-ile) 0.245 0.245 0.243 0.029 0.029 0.028
  (10%-ile) 0.206 0.202 0.196 0.024 0.024 0.024
  [N – firms]  2,163 1,709 1,578 2,163 1,709 1,578
   
  (continued on next page)
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 monthly wages in Euros log monthly wages in Euros 
 1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
Correlation(average 
wage, s.d. of 
wage), observ = a 
plant 
0.571* 0.589* 0.616* n.a. n.a  n.a. 
Average Wage for 
workers between 
25 and 30,  
observation = a 
person 
2,708.43 2,731.13 2,832.01 7.878 7.887 7.916
  (median) 2,628.39 2,647.54 2,738.93 7.874 7.881 7.915
  (s.d.) 639.17 634.27 740.02 0.227 0.224 0.257
  (90%-ile) 3,483.24 3,504.48 3,688.77 8.156 8.161 8.213
  (75%-ile) 3,003.81 3,038.16 3,190.57 8.007 8.019 8.067
  (25%-ile) 2,293.15 2,319.55 2,360.98 7.737 7.749 7.767
  (10%-ile) 2,023.95 2,053.61 2,062.87 7.612 7.627 7.631
  [N – workers] 292,220 172,243 69,017 292,220 172,243 69,017
Average Wage for 
workers between 
45 and 50,  
observation = a 
person 
3,280.06 3346.05 3,438.98 8.046 8.064 8.086
  (median) 3,040.57 3,095.89 3,161.72 8.019 8.038 8.059
  (s.d.) 1,072.67 1,115.22 1,204.48 0.313 0.318 0.336
  (90%-ile) 4,706.99 4,833.69 5,048.48 8.457 8.483 8.527
  (75%-ile) 3,920.19 3,981.54 4,082.18 8.274 8.289 8.314
  (25%-ile) 2,514.67 2,560.34 2,612.21 7.829 7.847 7.867
  (10%-ile) 2,136.32 2,166.89 2,211.54 7.667 7.681 7.701
  [N – workers] 227,483 158,982 105,460 227,483 158,982 105,460
* significant on a level of α < 0.05 
Source: linked-employer-employee-data of the Institute of Employment Research/ Germany,  
cross-sectional model, Version 1. 
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Table A 3.2: Structure of wages within and between plants (weighted values) 
 monthly wages in Euros log monthly wages in Euros 
  1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
Average Wage, 
observation = a 
person 
2808.99 2874.33 3,021.66 7.882 7.904 7.947
  (median) 2614.68 2662.79 2,778.85 7.869 7.887 7.929
  (s.d.) 984.09 1025.72 1,130.84 0.343 0.347 0.368
  (90%-ile) 4150.29 4284.84 4,552.66 8.331 8.363 8.423
  (75%-ile) 3291.25 3361.08 3,576.89 8.099 8.120 8.182
  (25%-ile) 2151.25 2194.55 2,267.37 7.674 7.693 7.726
  (10%-ile) 1776.12 1813.39 1,858.69 7.482 7.503 7.527
  [N – workers] 9,083,054 8,187,154 4,652,141 9,083,054 8,187,154 4,652,141
Average of plant 
average wage,  
observ = a plant  
2,535.99 2,595.01 2,645.80 7.773 7.780 7.795
  (median) 2,507.45 2,546.38 2,623.53 7.779 7.801 7.809
  (s.d.) 555.01 597.57 690.68 0.233 0.242 0.269
  (90%-ile) 3,251.58 3,347.32 3,616.41 8.045 8.073 8.148
  (75%-ile) 2,895.55 2,925.65 3,044.09 7.931 7.935 7.972
  (25%-ile) 2,171.04 2,220.07 2,151.13 7.644 7.648 7.618
  (10%-ile) 1,847.67 1,875.74 1,799.47 7.465 7.482 7.455
  [N – plants] 292,220 172,243 69,017 292,220 172,243 69,017
Average of s.d. of 
wage, observ = a 
plant 
703.75 708.16 760.17 0.269 0.265 0.286
  (median) 695.81 693.25 762.97 0.265 0.261 0.277
  (s.d.) 224.42 248.17 289.53 0.076 0.084 0.105
  (90%-ile) 992.09 1,038.20 1,110.95 0.367 0.363 0.416
  (75%-ile) 850.89 862.11 972.49 0.320 0.316 0.335
  (25%-ile) 547.89 533.42 556.28 0.218 0.209 0.218
  (10%-ile) 414.79 388.57 362.78 0.173 0.160 0.160
  [N – plants] 292,220 172,243 69,017 292,220 172,243 69,017
Average Coefficient 
of variation of 
wages, observ = a 
plant) 
0.281 0.278 0.289 0.035 0.034 0.037
  (median) 0.277 0.276 0.288 0.034 0.033 0.035
  (s.d.) 0.082 0.091 0.095 0.010 0.011 0.014
  (90%-ile) 0.384 0.386 0.416 0.047 0.047 0.054
  (75%-ile) 0.334 0.327 0.346 0.041 0.041 0.043
  (25%-ile) 0.226 0.218 0.226 0.028 0.027 0.028
  (10%-ile) 0.177 0.167 0.164 0.023 0.020 0.020
  [N – firms] 292,220 172,243 69,017 292,220 172,243 69,017
Correlation(average 
wage, s.d. of 
wage), observ = a 
plant 
0.498* 0.480* 0.604* n.a. n.a  n.a. 
* significant on a level of α < 0.05 
  (continued on next page)
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 monthly wages in Euros log monthly wages in Euros 
 1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
average Wage for 
workers between 25 
and 30, observation 
= a person 
2,472.50 2,490.99 2,571.29 7.779 7.786 7.809
  (median) 2,395.12 2,425.38 2,451.72 7.781 7.794 7.804
  (s.d.) 650.78 657.61 765.63 0.261 0.263 0.299
  (90%-ile) 3,286.77 3,299.86 3,515.17 8.097 8.101 8.164
  (75%-ile) 2,795.77 2,822.11 2,956.56 7.935 7.945 7.991
  (25%-ile) 2,049.23 2,066.89 2,084.02 7.625 7.633 7.642
  (10%-ile) 1,763.34 1,767.69 1,766.04 7.475 7.478 7.476
  [N – workers] 2,075,194 1,402,819 548,181 2,075,194 1,402,819 548,181
average Wage for 
workers between 45 
and 50, observation 
= a person 
3,033.17 3,069.02 3,142.69 7.956 7.964 7.982
  (median) 2,828.37 2,842.27 2,890.66 7.947 7.952 7.969
  (s.d.) 1,071.39 1,121.66 1,197.33 0.357 0.364 0.381
  (90%-ile) 4,459.18 4,583.83 4,743.76 8.402 8.431 8.464
  (75%-ile) 3,683.26 3,689.56 3,776.64 8.211 8.213 8.236
  (25%-ile) 2,289.23 2,306.39 2,339.59 7.736 7.743 7.757
  (10%-ile) 1,853.41 1,857.98 1,879.18 7.525 7.527 7.538
  [N – workers] 1,327,249 1,159,054 770,242 1,327,249 1,159,054 770,242
Source: linked-employer-employee-data of the Institute of Employment Research/ Germany,  
cross-sectional model, Version 1, weighted values. 
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Table A 3.3: Wage dynamics 
 change in monthly wages  
(in Euros) 
change in log monthly wages 
(in Euros) 
 1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
Average change in 
wage observation =  
a person 
-29.82 136.08 63.13 -0.101 0.043 0.018
  (median) -26.67 105.48 43.21 -0.100 0.039 0.016
  (s.d.) 486.69 482.26 601.42 0.115 0.112 0.013
  (90%-ile) 294.74 476.43 444.63 0.094 0.147 0.131
  (75%-ile) 80.89 238.19 171.86 0.296 0.083 0.059
  (25%-ile) -144.83 11.08 -48.33 -0.051 0.004 -0.017
  (10%-ile) -372.37 -163.01 -299.75 -0.118 -0.053 -0.089
  [N – workers] 1,612,065 1,058,246 621,576 1,612,065 1,058,246 621,576
Average of firm  
average change in 
wage, observ = a 
plant 
-9.44 103.43 53.67 - 0,004 0.038 0.021
  (median) -1.01 100.52 48.46 - 0.001 0.038 0.019
  (s.d.) 80.57 95.16 90.83 0.027 0.034 0.034
  (90%-ile) 75.83 214.74 148.51 0.025 0.072 0.055
  (75%-ile) 39.28 154.22 94.99 0.013 0.055 0.035
  (25%-ile) -49.55 51.81 10.87 - 0.017 0.023 0.006
  (10%-ile) -109.31 5.97 -34.62 - 0.039 0.004 - 0.012
  [N – plants] 2,163 1,709 1,578 2,163 1,709 1,578
Average of s.d. of 
change in wage,  
observ = a plant 
217.41 210.17 207.16 0.073 0.069 0.070
  (median) 209.51 203.61 199.28 0.071 0.066 0.067
  (s.d.) 71.37 73.77 81.81 0.019 0.020 0.024
  (90%-ile) 311.77 307.57 317.35 0.094 0.090 0.096
  (75%-ile) 264.51 255.27 254.62 0.083 0.079 0.081
  (25%-ile) 168.29 157.57 151.62 0.060 0.057 0.055
  (10%-ile) 130.83 120.84 112.77 0.051 0.049 0.045
  [N – plants] 2,163 1,709 1,578 2,163 1,709 1,578
Avg Coefficient**  
of variation of  
change in wages, 
observ = a plant) 
4.814 3.849 6.086 0.228 0.231 0.294
  (median) 3.423 2.755 3.822 0.223 0.219 0.284
  (s.d.) 107.33 26.309 385.056 0.058 0.069 0.097
  (90%-ile) 9.127 7.639 15.978 0.307 0.313 0.392
  (75%-ile) 5.487 4.219 8.046 0.249 0.259 0.336
  (25%-ile) 2.189 1.742 1.553 0.186 0.188 0.238
  (10%-ile) 0.989 0.816 -4.934 0.159 0.161 0.191
  [N – plants] 2,163 1,709 1,578 2,163 1706 1,578
** divided by hundred  
  (continued on next page)
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 change in monthly wages  
(in Euros) 
change in log monthly wages 
 (in Euros) 
 1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
Avg change in wage 
for people with  
tenure < 3 years, 
observ = a person 
34.75 156.25 94.51 0.012 0.053 0.030
  (median) 18.09 117.59 54.61 0.007 0.046 0.021
  (s.d.) 443.73 467.19 558.82 0.118 0.118 0.138
  (90%-ile) 336.82 500.61 461.33 0.119 0.163 0.149
  (75%-ile) 137.28 258.54 197.19 0.054 0.095 0.073
  (25%-ile) -84.71 23.55 -26.61 -0.036 0.009 -0.010
  (10%-ile) -254.06 -134.86 -203.64 -0.093 -0.048 -0.071
  [N – workers] 236,672 165,071 105,938 236,672 165,071 105,938
Avg change in wage 
for people with  
tenure > 3 years, 
observ = a person 
-40.93 132.36 56.68 -0.014 0.042 0.017
  (median) -33.54 103.45 41.10 -0.012 0.038 0.015
  (s.d.) 492.86 484.90 609.62 0.105 0.111 0.120
  (90%-ile) 284.58 471.55 440.42 0.083 0.144 0.121
  (75%-ile) 68.94 234.15 166.52 0.026 0.081 0.156
  (25%-ile) -154.89 8.64 -53.66 -0.046 0.003 -0.018
  (10%-ile) -392.05 -168.39 -321.58 -0.107 -0.054 -0.092
  [N – workers] 1,375,393 893,175 515,638 1,375,393 893,175 515,638
Source: linked-employer-employee-data of the Institute of Employment Research/ Germany,  
cross-sectional model, Version 1. 
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Table A 3.4: Wage dynamics (weighted values) 
 change in monthly wages 
 (in Euros) 
change in log monthly wages 
 (in Euros) 
 1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
Average change in 
wage observation  
= a person 
-13.82 103.49 57.08 -0.005 0.036 0.016
  (median) -13.71 78.86 37.22 -0.006 0.032 0.014
  (s.d.) 405.27 398.19 485.91 0.108 0.104 0.129
  (90%-ile) 255.01 378.33 364.73 0.092 0.131 0.127
  (75%-ile) 81.05 188.90 148.10 0.033 0.073 0.056
  (25%-ile) -110.37 -1.84 -38.67 -0.043 -0.001 -0.015
  (10%-ile) -294.32 -144.37 -215.48 -0.104 -0.053 -0.075
  [N – workers] 9,069,945 8,187,154 4,646,177 9,069,945 8,187,154 4,646,177
Average of firm 
average change in 
wage, observ = a 
plant 
6.51 73.33 36.94 0.003 0.031 0.018
  (median) 6.35 71.29 36.26 0.003 0.032 0.018
  (s.d.) 94.71 98.65 105.52 0.038 0.039 0.041
  (90%-ile) 115.87 177.89 143.22 0.047 0.071 0.060
  (75%-ile) 54.48 124.58 87.27 0.022 0.051 0.036
  (25%-ile) - 43.16 18.91 -10.21 - 0.017 0.012 - 0.001
  (10%-ile) - 95.49 -35.57 -69.94 - 0.041 - 0.009 - 0.021
  [N – plants] 292,220 172,243 69,017 292,220 172,243 69,017
Average of s.d. of 
change in wage, 
observ = a plant 
189.82 180.21 185.73 0.072 0.068 0.071
  (median) 181.54 166.99 168.60 0.069 0.062 0.065
  (s.d.) 76.26 78.41 93.09 0.027 0.027 0.038
  (90%-ile) 296.17 285.94 310.75 0.108 0.097 0.105
  (75%-ile) 236.89 222.80 243.11 0.085 0.082 0.084
  (25%-ile) 135.12 121.86 126.14 0.053 0.051 0.048
  (10%-ile) 96.84 90.27 80.85 0.043 0.040 0.037
  [N – plants] 292,220 172,243 69,017 292,220 172,243 69,017
Avg Coefficient**  
of variation of 
change in wages, 
observ = a plant) 
1.213 0.061 0.163 0.214 0.074 0.510
  (median) 0.048 0.027 0.039 0.045 0.024 0.034
  (s.d.) 31.55 0.156 2.322 0.262 0.040 4.712
  (90%-ile) 0.217 0.119 0.182 0.093 0.092 0.207
  (75%-ile)  0.095 0.052 0.088 0.092 0.047 0.078
  (25%-ile) 0.025 0.017 0.021 0.022 0.014 0.019
  (10%-ile) 0.152 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.014
[N – plants] 292,220 172,243 69,017 292,220 172,243 69,017
** divided by hundred  
  (continued on next page)
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 change in monthly wages  
(in Euros) 
change in log monthly wages 
 (in Euros) 
 1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
Avg change in 
wage for people 
with tenure < 3 
years , observ = a 
person 
27.61 115.40 73.78 0.011 0.044 0.026
  (median) 13.48 85.01 46.08 0.067 0.037 0.019
  (s.d.) 356.03 374.94 481.62 0.113 0.111 0.133
  (90%-ile) 283.85 388.67 389.21 0.114 0.144 0.137
  (75%-ile) 119.53 199.81 167.38 0.052 0.082 0.067
  (25%-ile) -74.59 6.64 -29.35 -0.033 0.003 -0.013
  (10%-ile) -223.79 -128.74 -183.85 -0.091 -0.051 -0.073
  [N – workers] 2,089,873 2,002,997 1,160,379 2,089,873 2,002,997 1,160,379
Avg change in 
wage for people 
with tenure > 3 
years, observ = a 
person 
-26.22 99.64 51.65 -0.009 0.033 0.016
  (median) -21.28 77.17 36.60 -0.008 0.303 0.014
  (s.d.) 418.09 405.36 517.64 0.106 0.102 0.119
  (90%-ile) 242.58 374.98 360.59 0.829 0.126 0.114
  (75%-ile) 67.77 185.52 143.07 0.026 0.069 0.052
  (25%-ile) -121.17 -4.019 -36.78 -0.046 -0.002 -0.014
  (10%-ile) -317.24 -150.51 -223.47 -0.107 -0.054 -0.073
  [N – workers] 6,980,071 6,184,157 3,486,152 6,980,071 6,184,157 3,486,152
Source: linked-employer-employee-data of the Institute of Employment Research/ Germany,  
cross-sectional model, Version 1, weighted values. 
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Table A 3.5: Mobility Panel A: all jobs 
 all plants all plants (weighted values) 
 1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
Employees 812.415 696.544 453.927 100.315 94.229 86.165
  (s.d.) 2119.559 1552.058 1286.649 395.994 310.298 374.508
Number of occupations 35.012 33.351 26.455 13.776 13.152 13.013
  (s.d.) 27.262 25.798 21.565 11.056 10.612 10.356
Employment growth -0.049 -0.020 -0.047 -0.017 -0.002 -0.042
  (s.d.) 0.153 0.163 0.237 0.151 0.158 0.231
Exit rate 0.169 0.147 0.202 0.187 0.163 0.227
  (s.d.) 0.135 0.132 0.204 0.132 0.128 0.195
Exit rate, top decile of 
plant wages 0.154 0.156 0.226 0.183 0.137 0.223
  (s.d.) 0.183 0.182 0.246 0.177 0.142 0.199
Exit rate, top quartile of 
plant wages 0.147 0.139 0.193 0.161 0.127 0.213
  (s.d.) 0.158 0.152 0.210 0.144 0.133 0.182
Exit rate, bottom decile 
of plant wages 0.246 0.209 0.338 0.247 0.228 0.292
  (s.d.) 0.153 0.140 0.213 0.153 0.147 0.184
Exit rate, bottom  
quartile of plant wages 0.209 0.179 0.306 0.219 0.191 0.291
  (s.d.) 0.127 0.150 0.229 0.134 0.139 0.181
Entry rate 0.111 0.121 0.150 0.159 0.157 0.179
  (s.d.) 0.102 0.113 0.156 0.125 0.141 0.177
Entry rate, top decile of 
plant wages 0.097 0.109 0.137 0.200 0.227 0.161
  (s.d.) 0.101 0.139 0.155 0.152 0.194 0.151
Entry rate, top quartile of 
plant wages 0.090 0.096 0.125 0.137 0.117 0.150
  (s.d.) 0.085 0.105 0.135 0.125 0.118 0.148
Entry rate, bottom  
decile of plant wages 0.182 0.194 0.306 0.200 0.227 0.248
  (s.d.) 0.143 0.169 0.271 0.152 0.194 0.234
Entry rate, bottom  
quartile of plant wages 0.147 0.162 0.261 0.181 0.187 0.250
  (s.d.) 0.123 0.143 0.231 0.132 0.166 0.218
% of employees who 
switch jobs** internally 0.027 0.021 0.020 0.024 0.014 0.015
  (s.d.) 0.048 0.035 0.045 0.052 0.030 0.034
% of workers who have 
been at plant 3+ years 0.664 0.665 0.590 0.585 0.584 0.545
  (s.d.) 0.194 0.275 0.337 0.217 0.282 0.324
   
** change in the 3-digit occupational code  
  
  
  (continued with correlations on next page)
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 all plants all plants (weighted values) 
 1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
correlation (exit rate,  
log average wage), ob-
serv = a plant 
- 0.225* - 0.143* - 0.109* - 0.248* - 0.267* - 0.165* 
correlation (exit rate,  
log average wage  
change), observ = a 
plant 
- 0.017* - 0.118* 0.015 0.006 - 0.026* - 0.025* 
correlation (exit rate, 
s.d. of log wage),  
observ = a plant 
0.079* 0.079* 0.062* 0.114* 0.125* - 0.080* 
correlation (entry rate, 
log average wage),  
observ = a plant 
- 0.321* - 0.291* - 0.244* - 0.218* - 0.292* - 0.183* 
correlation (entry rate, 
log average wage 
change), observ = a 
plant 
0.205* 0.069* 0.073* 0.142* 0.089* 0.014 
correlation (entry rate, 
s.d. of log wage),  
observ = a plant 
0.139* 0.128* 0.093* 0.057* 0.073* - 0.118* 
notes: all statistics are on establishment level ; a * indicates significance on a level of α < 0.05 
Source: linked-employer-employee-data of the Institute of Employment Research/ Germany,  
cross-sectional model, Version 1. 
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Table A 3.6: Mobility Panel B: high level jobs 
  all plants  all plants (weighted values) 
  1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
Employees 157.661 131.322 68.213 29.900 28.225 21.523
  (s.d.) 313.019 257.689 123.875 72.246 60.801 42.907
Number of occupations 15.290 14.098 9.595 6.786 6.596 5.495
  (s.d.) 12.728 11.612 7.740 5.302 4.984 4.103
Employment growth -0.081 -0.105 -0.080 -0.089 -0.030 -0.099
  (s.d.) 0.308 0.317 0.385 0.339 0.329 0.387
Exit rate 0.114 0.116 0.159 0.119 0.119 0.156
  (s.d.) 0.186 0.190 0.242 0.254 0.260 0.292
Exit rate, top decile of 
plant wages 0.121 0.131 0.182 0.148 0.113 0.175
  (s.d.) 0.173 0.178 0.223 0.175 0.127 0.185
Exit rate, top quartile  
of plant wages 0.109 0.109 0.156 0.106 0.088 0.167
  (s.d.) 0.149 0.141 0.192 0.138 0.120 0.180
Exit rate, bottom decile  
of plant wages 0.134 0.149 0.269 0.159 0.184 0.358
  (s.d.) 0.307 0.317 0.524 0.410 0.389 0.719
Exit rate, bottom quartile 
of plant wages 0.116 0.141 0.226 0.127 0.155 0.286
  (s.d.) 0.232 0.291 0.452 0.323 0.366 0.604
Entry rate 0.060 0.074 0.091 0.079 0.086 0.093
  (s.d.) 0.111 0.175 0.183 0.171 0.239 0.220
Entry rate, top decile of 
plant wages 0.062 0.065 0.093 0.092 0.087 0.101
  (s.d.) 0.080 0.081 0.131 0.121 0.122 0.117
Entry rate, top quartile of 
plant wages 0.053 0.054 0.081 0.075 0.061 0.089
  (s.d.) 0.068 0.066 0.118 0.099 0.091 0.139
Entry rate, bottom decile 
of plant wages 0.104 0.110 0.219 0.127 0.118 0.125
  (s.d.) 0.229 0.276 0.421 0.304 0.331 0.367
Entry rate, bottom  
quartile of plant wages 0.079 0.100 0.138 0.096 0.093 0.997
  (s.d.) 0.169 0.256 0.338 0.234 0.278 0.351
% of employees who 
switch jobs** internally 0.026 0.019 0.019 0.024 0.013 0.014
  (s.d.) 0.060 0.049 0.068 0.077 0.047 0.055
% of workers who have 
been at plant 3+ years 0.636 0.669 0.628 0.561 0.627 0.605
  (s.d.) 0.259 0.310 0.391 0.277 0.330 0.389
** change in the 3-digit occupational code  
 (continued on next page with correlations)
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 all plants  all plants (weighted values) 
 1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
correlation (exit rate, log 
average wage), observ =  
a plant 
- 0.046* - 0.047* - 0.031* - 0.090* - 0.117* - 0.055* 
correlation (exit rate, log 
average wage change), 
observ = a plant 
- 0.004 - 0.129* 0.025* 0.007 - 0.067* 0.138* 
correlation (exit rate, s.d. 
of log wage), observ = a 
plant 
- 0.063* - 0.089* - 0.075* - 0.072* - 0.103* - 0.146* 
correlation (entry rate,  
log average wage),  
observ = a plant 
- 0.128* - 0.137* 0.016 - 0.096* - 0.143* - 0.013 
correlation (entry rate,  
log average wage 
change), observ = a plant 
0.118* - 0.004 - 0.055* 0.135* - 0.013 0.060* 
correlation (entry rate,  
s.d. of log wage), observ  
= a plant 
0.053* - 0.035* - 0.051* - 0.001 0.016 - 0.092* 
notes: all statistics are on establishment level ; a * indicates significance on a level of α <  0.05 
Source: linked-employer-employee-data of the Institute of Employment Research/Germany, 
cross-sectional model, Version 1. 
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Table A 3.7: Mobility Panel C: low level jobs 
  all plants  all plants (weighted values) 
  1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
Employees 223.284 181.506 111.529 66.920 59.406 54.314
  (s.d.) 839.317 562.563 494.572 300.380 217.421 301.362
Number of occupations 17.890 16.660 11.807 11.795 10.997 9.409
  (s.d.) 17.825 16.750 13.458 10.090 9.539 9.223
Employment growth -0.039 -0.081 -0.060 -0.027 -0.084 -0.044
  (s.d.) 0.305 0.303 0.360 0.231 0.237 0.348
Exit rate 0.252 0.222 0.317 0.240 0.214 0.313
  (s.d.) 0.189 0.206 0.319 0.182 0.178 0.264
Exit rate, top decile of plant 
wages 0.333 0.349 0.450 0.309 0.298 0.451
  (s.d.) 0.295 0.342 0.429 0.352 0.287 0.367
Exit rate, top quartile of plant 
wages 0.309 0.298 0.383 0.312 0.288 0.377
  (s.d.) 0.261 0.291 0.374 0.299 0.273 0.317
Exit rate, bottom decile of 
plant wages 0.251 0.211 0.316 0.218 0.203 0.327
  (s.d.) 0.159 0.143 0.211 0.129 0.118 0.168
Exit rate, bottom quartile of 
plant wages 0.225 0.186 0.289 0.211 0.176 0.262
  (s.d.) 0.137 0.105 0.237 0.116 0.123 0.197
Entry rate 0.181 0.203 0.352 0.203 0.241 0.373
  (s.d.) 0.182 0.192 0.363 0.184 0.229 0.329
Entry rate, top decile of plant 
wages 0.248 0.277 0.476 0.261 0.359 0.420
  (s.d.) 0.269 0.297 0.495 0.249 0.386 0.465
Entry rate, top quartile of 
plant wages 0.216 0.245 0.418 0.232 0.313 0.409
  (s.d.) 0.229 0.258 0.430 0.219 0.321 0.410
Entry rate, bottom decile of 
plant wages 0.190 0.201 0.306 0.189 0.212 0.369
  (s.d.) 0.163 0.179 0.287 0.143 0.181 0.335
Entry rate, bottom quartile of 
plant wages 0.163 0.176 0.267 0.176 0.183 0.322
  (s.d.) 0.142 0.153 0.244 0.144 0.167 0.305
% of employees who switch 
jobs** internally 0.022 0.015 0.021 0.020 0.012 0.023
  (s.d.) 0.074 0.054 0.083 0.062 0.051 0.090
% of workers who have 
been at plant 3+ years 0.831 0.767 0.708 0.835 0.728 0.733
  (s.d.) 0.234 0.327 0.403 0.202 0.349 0.395
** change in the 3-digit occupational code  
 (continued on next page with correlations)
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 all plants  all plants (weighted values) 
 1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
correlation (exit rate, log 
average wage), observ = a 
plant 
0.134* 0.193* 0.187* 0.078* 0.099* 0.112* 
correlation (exit rate, log 
average wage change),  
observ = a plant 
0.024* - 0.025* 0.045* 0.088* 0.016* - 0.022* 
correlation (exit rate, s.d. of 
log wage), observ = a plant - 0.057* - 0.087* - 0.083* - 0.051* - 0.035* - 0.104* 
correlation (entry rate, log 
average wage), observ = a 
plant 
0.046* 0.099* 0.194* 0.135* 0.008 0.156* 
correlation (entry rate, log 
average wage change),  
observ = a plant 
0.181* 0.083* 0.039* 0.070* 0.055* - 0.015 
correlation (entry rate, s.d. 
of log wage), observ = a 
plant 
- 0.057* - 0.067* - 0.158* - 0.131* - 0.100* - 0.257* 
notes: all statistics are on establishment level ; a * indicates significance on a level of α <  0.05 
Source: linked-employer-employee-data of the Institute of Employment Research/Germany,  
cross-sectional model, Version 1. 
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Appendix A 4: Covariates in the wage regressions for 
table 6 and 7 
(regression results not printed; they will be 
published in Alda (2005a) and are available 
upon request) 
 
a) worker characteristics 
time/spell variant (= xit):   
age (age²/100; age³/10000) tenure (in years) education level 
current occupation group multiple jobs 
   (yes/no) 
days of employment/ 
days of unemploy-
ment * 100 
days of employment / days 
unobserved * 100 
no. of employers no. of unemployment 
phases 
time/spell invariant:   
gender nationality existence of leave of 
absence (f.e. sabbati-
cals) 
b) plant characteristics 
time/spell variant (= wit):   
size (ten dummies) collective agreement 
(branch/plant level 
yes/no) 
works council 
(yes/no) 
economic situation 
(subjective measure) 
paying more than col-
lectively negotiated 
wages (yes/no) 
sum of investment 
(log) per capita 
weekly worked hours outsourcing activities vacancies 
organizational change no. of occupation churning 
proportions of: fixed-term contracts, females and university degrees 
time/spell invariant:   
ownership single-plant firm 
(yes/no) 
urbanity 
sector (ten dummies)   
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Appendix A 5: Symbols and indices for wage regressions 
 
Indices: 
i : individuals j : plants t : time (years) 
Symbols: 
μ : constant 
x : observable time variant person characteristics 
w : observable time variant plant characteristics 
θi : unobserved person fixed effect 
ψj : unobserved firm fixed effect 
B : occupation groups  
note: θi and ψj include the time invariant covariates of persons/plants.  
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Appendix A 6: Information about the regression tech-
niques 
A more detailed description of the regression techniques is given by An-
drews/Schank/Upward (2004), hereafter ASU: 
For the spell-level fixed effect regression (Spell-FE) we define  
(A 2.1)  λs = θi + ψj  
for each unique worker-firm combination (=spell). Neither θi nor ψj vary 
within a spell. The wage regression is then 
(A 2.2.)  yit = xitβ + wjtγ + λijt + εit
with 
(A 2.3.)  sλ  =∑  λijt/ n = λijt
n is the number of observations (worker years) within a specific spell. 
Computing the mean deviations for each observation within a spell is  
(A 2.4.)  yit - sy  = (xit - sx )ß + (wjt- sw )γ + (λijt- sλ ) + (εit - sε ) . 
Because of (A 2.3.) is sλ  - λijt  = 0. The estimator is consistent, because he 
sweeps out both unobserved heterogeneities. He is not the most efficient 
one (because a Least Square Dummy Variable regression, LSDV, is).  
The time-invariant covariates are constant within a spell and therefore 
swept out. The following example for a standard one-way-fixed-model 
with worker data only shows, how the wage effect of the time-invariant 
covariates are identified. The one-way wage regression is:  
(A 2.5.)  yit = μ + xitβ + θi + εit . 
The standard fixed effect (FE) estimator of β can be interpreted as an In-
strumented Variable (IV) estimator (ASU, 10; Verbeek (2004), section 
10.2.5.)). Then we can formulate  
(A 2.6.)  βˆ FE = [ (x∑i ∑t it - ix )' (xit - ix ) ]-1 ∑i ∑t (xit - ix )' (yit - iy )  
      = [ (x∑i ∑t it - ix )' xit]-1 ∑i ∑t (xit - ix )' yit
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Further details for the Spell-FE regression can be found in ASU, page 10-
11. All variables correlated with the unobservables are instrumented by 
their mean deviations. Time-invariant variables are “instrumented with 
themselves” making the usual random effect assumption. The estimator is 
a special case of the Hausman/Taylor estimator (Hausman/Taylor 1981). 
For explicitly calculating (and not sweeping out) the unobserved fixed ef-
fects we set all firm effects with less than 16 movers into a single common 
effect (AKM, 293). This allows us to connect all groups (45) into one by 
constructing an artificial plant which contains all plants (and workers) who 
experience little turnover. After this procedure we time-demean the re-
maining plant dummies (this is what ASU call FEiLSDVj) and compute θi 
with the estimated values of ψj.  
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Appendix A 7: Comparison of mean values using propen-
sity score matching 
  1993 1995 2000 
average wage collective contract 2737.12 2718.51 2871.85 
 without col. contr. 2680.51 2775.73 2724.71 
 t-value 0.64 -0.53 2.77 
s.d. of wage collective contract 792.28 744.24 847.53 
 without col. contr. 806.30 837.45 818.31 
 t-value -0.45 -2.25 1.43 
change in wage collective contract 29.53 94.18 49.96 
 without col. contr. 16.31 87.88 60.32 
 t-value 0.99 0.33 -1.38 
collective contract 0.29 0.27 0.30 
without col. contr. 0.31 0.31 0.31 
coefficient of 
variation of 
change in wage t-value -1.39 -2.67 -1.54 
exitrate collective contract 0.18 0.17 0.20 
 without col. contr. 0.26 0.19 0.22 
 t-value -3.74 -1.13 -3.30 
entryrate collective contract 0.17 0.18 0.15 
 without col. contr. 0.19 0.19 0.19 
 t-value -1.37 -0.50 -3.10 
collective contract 0.56 0.63 0.55 
without col. contr. 0.49 0.49 0.52 
% of workers 
who have been 
at plant 3+ years 
t-value 2.28 3.37 1.46 
Notes: 
Treatment group are plants without collective contract, control group are plants with  
collective contract; t-value for H0: identical mean values. 
There are in 1993 120 (1995: 91; 2000: 193) plants without collective agreement in the 
sample. For each of these plants a statistical twin plant is drawn using a nearest neighbour  
propensity score matching. Statistical twins are in the same of eight size and ten sector  
classes. The probit estimation for obtaining propensity scores uses covariates equal to  
Kohaut/Schnabel, 2003b augmented by the proportion of university degrees and the  
average age of workers in a plant.  
 
Source: linked-employer-employee-data of the Institute of Employment Research/Germany,  
cross-sectional model, Version 1. 
 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 18/2005   61
In dieser Reihe sind zuletzt erschienen 
Recently published 
No. Author(s) Title Date 
1/2004 Bauer, Th. K., 
Bender, St.,  
Bonin, H. 
Dismissal Protection and Worker Flows in 
Small Establishments 
7/2004 
2/2004 Achatz, J.,  
Gartner, H., 
Glück, T. 
Bonus oder Bias? Mechanismen geschlechts-
spezifischer Entlohnung 
7/2004 
3/2004 Andrews, M., 
Schank, Th., 
Upward, R. 
Practical estimation methods for linked  
employer-employee data 
8/2004 
4/2004 Brixy, U.,  
Kohaut, S., 
Schnabel; C. 
Do newly founded firms pay lower wages? 
First evidence from Germany 
9/2004 
5/2004 Kölling, A, 
Rässler, S. 
Editing and multiply imputing German estab-
lishment panel data to estimate stochastic  
production frontier models 
10/2004 
6/2004 Stephan, G, 
Gerlach, K. 
Collective Contracts, Wages and Wage  
Dispersion in a Multi-Level Model 
10/2004 
7/2004 Gartner, H. 
Stephan, G. 
How Collective Contracts and Works Councils 
Reduce the Gender Wage Gap 
12/2004 
    
1/2005 Blien, U.,  
Suedekum, J. 
Local Economic Structure and Industry 
Development in Germany, 1993-2001 
1/2005 
2/2005 Brixy, U., 
Kohaut, S., 
Schnabel, C. 
How fast do newly founded firms mature? 
Empirical analyses on job quality in start-ups 
1/2005 
3/2005 Lechner, M., 
Miquel, R., 
Wunsch, C. 
Long-Run Effects of Public Sector Sponsored 
Training in West Germany 
1/2005 
4/2005 Hinz, Th., 
Gartner, H. 
Lohnunterschiede zwischen Frauen und  
Männern in Branchen, Berufen und Betrieben 
2/2005 
5/2005 Gartner, H., 
Rässler, S. 
Analyzing the Changing Gender Wage Gap 
based on Multiply Imputed Right Censored 
Wages 
3/2005 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 18/2005   62
6/2005 Alda, H., 
Bender, S., 
Gartner, H. 
The linked employer-employee dataset of the 
IAB (LIAB) 
3/2005 
7/2005 Haas, A., 
Rothe, Th. 
Labour market dynamics from a regional  
perspective 
The multi-account system 
4/2005 
8/2005 Caliendo, M., 
Hujer, R., 
Thomsen, S.L. 
Identifying Effect Heterogeneity to Improve 
the Efficiency of Job Creation Schemes in 
Germany 
4/2005 
9/2005 Gerlach, K., 
Stephan, G. 
Wage Distributions by Wage-Setting Regime 4/2005 
10/2005 Gerlach, K., 
Stephan, G. 
Individual Tenure and Collective Contracts 4/2005 
11/2005 Blien, U., 
Hirschenauer, 
F. 
Formula allocation: The regional allocation of 
budgetary funds for measures of active labour 
market policy in Germany 
4/2005 
12/2005 Alda, H., 
Allaart, P., 
Bellmann, L. 
Churning and institutions – Dutch and German 
establishments compared with micro-level 
data 
5/2005 
13/2005 Caliendo, M., 
Hujer, R., 
Thomsen, St. 
Individual Employment Effects of Job Creation 
Schemes in Germany with Respect to Sectoral 
Heterogeneity 
5/2005 
14/2005 Lechner, M.; 
Miquel, R., 
Wunsch, C. 
The Curse and Blessing of Training the  
Unemployed in a Changing Economy 
- The Case of East Germany after Unification 
6/2005 
15/2005 Jensen, U.; 
Rässler, S. 
Where have all the data gone? Stochastic 
production frontiers with multiply imputed 
German establishment data 
7/2005 
16/2005 Schnabel, C.; 
Zagelmeyer, 
S.; Kohaut, S. 
Collective bargaining structure and ist deter-
minants: An empirical analysis with British and 
German establishment data 
8/2005 
17/2005 Koch, S.; 
Stephan, G.; 
Walwei, U. 
Workfare: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen 8/2005 
    
 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 18/2005  63 
 
Impressum 
 
 IABDiscussionPaper 
No. 18 / 2005 
 
Herausgeber 
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 
der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
Weddigenstr. 20-22 
D-90478 Nürnberg 
 
Redaktion 
Regina Stoll, Jutta Palm-Nowak 
 
Technische Herstellung 
Jutta Sebald 
 
 
Rechte 
Nachdruck – auch auszugsweise – nur mit 
Genehmigung des IAB gestattet  
 
Bezugsmöglichkeit 
Volltext-Download dieses DiscussionPaper 
unter: 
http://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2005/dp1805.pdf
 
IAB im Internet 
http://www.iab.de 
 
Rückfragen zum Inhalt an 
Holger Alda, Tel. 0911/179-3138, 
oder e-Mail: holger.alda@iab.de  
 
 
 
